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Compensating Demand Response Participants
Via Their Shapley Values
Gearo´id O’Brien, Abbas El Gamal and Ram Rajagopal
Abstract—Designing fair compensation mechanisms for
demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models
the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a pay-
ment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value.
As exact computation of the Shapley Value is in general
intractable, we propose estimating it using a reinforcement
learning algorithm that approximates optimal stratified
sampling. We apply this algorithm to two DR programs
that utilize the Shapley Value for payments and quantify
the accuracy of the resulting estimates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response, or adjusting the aggregate load
profile as a means to help balance supply and demand in
electricity grids, is becoming an important approach to
improve grid reliability. Utilities such as PG&E [1] allow
for third party operators to administer DR programs
through schemes such as Aggregator Managed Portfo-
lios. These operators (or ‘aggregators’) are responsible
for most of the program details, including marketing,
enrollment, and payments to participants.
Designing, implementing, and operating large scale
DR programs is a non-trivial task, however. Ensuring
that participants remain enrolled in the scheme — and
that it is also appealing to new participants — relies
in part on a fair and attractive compensation mecha-
nism. The typical mechanism design problem focuses on
distributing the total revenue accrued by an aggregator
to all participants, in proportion to their contribution in
addition to achieving fairness and enrollment incentives.
Design of demand response schemes has been exten-
sively investigated in the literature [2]. Several papers
have investigated price based mechanisms for various
types of response capabilities [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8]. Mechanisms based on cooperative games have been
investigated more recently [9], [10], but attention has
focused on specific formats where consumers make
choices under parameterized utility functions. Instead in
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this paper, we propose a simple payment scheme based
on a traditional cooperative game solution concept: the
Shapley Value.
Understanding the advantage of using the Shapley
Value when compared to other conventional distribution
methods is crucial to assessing the contribution of this
paper. In the proposed mechanism each consumer that
agrees to participate in a DR program receives a payment
for cooperating and forming a coalition. The value of a
coalition is a function measuring how close that coalition
comes to achieving the goal of the DR program. A
simple such function encapsulates the penalty (in dollars)
imposed by the utility on the aggregator for failing
to meet an agreed upon commitment for the chosen
coalition. The aggregator needs to decide then how to
distribute the penalty fairly among the participants. Dis-
tributing penalties or payments in DR schemes is integral
to their success, primarily in situations where partic-
ipants are free to choose from a number of schemes.
The Shapley Value solution concept provides a fair and
unique method for distributing the total penalty when the
penalty function satisfies some conditions. Although the
use of the word ‘fair’ may seem vague in this context, it
is a precisely defined term satisfying the following four
concepts, which reasonable distribution schemes should
satisfy:
Efficiency: The entire payment or penalty is di-
vided among the participants (no excess remains).
Symmetry: Two participants that contribute
equally are rewarded equally.
Null Player: Participants that do not contribute
receive no payoff.
Linearity: The total payoff rewarded for contribut-
ing to two programs is the sum of the payoff that
would have been awarded for contributing to each
of the two programs individually.
Surprisingly, the Shapley Value can be proven to be the
only payment distribution method that satisfies the four
axioms above, with the added benefit that the solution is
unique. The issue of appropriately allocating penalties to
participants is an important problem in demand response
that has not been the focus of much research. The
Shapley Value is an attractive solution to the problem.
The Shapley Value has been previously used in studies
2on electrical energy generation and transmission. In [11],
the Shapley Value is used to allocate transmission service
costs among network users in energy markets. In [12]
the aggregation of wind power producers is studied using
coalition game theory and show that the resulting game is
not convex so the Shapley Value may not be appropriate.
The most challenging aspect in utilizing the Shap-
ley Value is its computational intractability. For a DR
program with n participants, the value function must
be evaluated n 2n times. A modest DR program with
n = 500 requires 1.5× 10153 function evaluations. Ap-
proximation approaches have been proposed to mitigate
this problem. They rely on simple schemes to selec-
tively perform function evaluations. Shapley proposed a
Monte-Carlo random sampling technique [13], extended
in [14] and [15] to achieve desired accuracy levels
in polynomial time. Such mechanisms neither exploit
relevant properties of the value function nor enforce
important constraints such as budget balance.
This paper, which is an extended and more complete
version of [16], proposes a Shapley Value based distri-
bution of Demand Response payments (or penalties) and
a new algorithm for estimation that is significantly faster
and more accurate than prior approaches. The rest of this
paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief
introduction to the Shapley Value. Section III describes a
method of estimating the Shapley Value using a pseudo-
random sampling technique that significantly reduces
the variance of the estimate when compared to random
sampling. In Section IV, we analyze two simple demand
response programs and utilize the Shapley Value as a
means of compensating the participants in the scheme.
II. DEMAND RESPONSE AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
Consider a set X = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n participants
in a DR scheme. A “participant” could be a user or a
user-load if such granularity is available. For the set S ⊆
X , define the value function (or characteristic function)
v(S) as the total penalty imposed on the participants in
S if they do not achieve the DR goal. For example, if
the goal of the DR program is to provide reserve by
reducing load levels, the value function may be taken as
v(S) = −
[∑
i∈S
(
Xi − X˜i
)]
+
, (1)
where Xi ∈ R is the amount participant i agreed to
reduce its load by and X˜i ∈ R is the amount it actually
reduced it by. As [x]
+
= max{x, 0}, v(S) is non-
zero when the aggregate discrepancy is greater than 0.
Additional choices of value functions are discussed in
detail in Section IV. We assume the general function
v(S) is submodular (see [17] for a definition).
The operator wishes to distribute the total penalty
v(X ) among the n participants in a fair manner, depen-
dent on their relative contributions to the goal of the DR
scheme. We denote the penalty assigned to participant i
as φi. Hence the total penalty is
v(X ) =
n∑
i=1
φi. (2)
Shapley proposed a solution to the distribution of the
total penalty that is both unique and fair when penalty
functions are submodular [17] . For a given participant,
it is the mean marginal contribution of that participant to
all possible coalitions of the other participants. Defining
X−i to be the set of all participants after removing
participant i, the marginal contribution of participant i
to a coalition S, S ⊆ X−i, is
ρi(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S). (3)
Furthermore, we define R to be one of the n! permuta-
tions of the participants in X , and PRi to be the ordered
set preceding i in R. The Shapley Value is defined as
φi(v) =
1
n!
∑
R
ρi(P
R
i ). (4)
Clearly, direct calculation of the Shapley Value using
equation (4) is intractable. For example, with a value
function as seemingly elementary as that shown in (1),
the function is of a form max{x, 0} and the Shapley
value is computationally intensive to calculate. Hence,
it is typically estimated using sampling techniques.
The following section details a computationally efficient
method for estimating the Shapley Value via sampling.
Remark. For brevity we suppress the v and denote the
Shapley Value by φi. The value function assumed should
be clear from the context.
A. Value Functions and Demand Response Schemes
In order to use the Shapley value as a distribution
mechanism of a DR scheme, the scheme itself must be
representable as a value function. This function, defined
over subsets of the participants, returns the penalty that
will be imposed on the operator of the DR scheme. Value
functions are particularly suited to schemes where loads
are controllable to some degree. The formulation of the
value function is left to the designer of the DR scheme
as this paper is neither involved with choosing the value
function itself nor designing DR schemes.
III. ESTIMATING THE SHAPLEY VALUE
Before describing our algorithm for estimating the
Shapley Value, we need the following alternative for-
mulation. Grouping the terms in equation (4) in which
3the participants to the left of i are the same gives the
alternative form for the Shapley Value
φi =
∑
S⊆X
−i
|S|!(|X | − |S| − 1)!
n!
ρi(S). (5)
Further grouping by the number of terms in S, defining
j = |S|, and recalling that n = |X | we obtain
φi =
n−1∑
j=0
∑
S⊆X
−i
(
j!(n− j − 1)!
n!
)
ρi(S)
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
∑
S⊆X
−i
(
(n− 1)!
j!(n− 1− j)!
)−1
ρi(S)
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
∑
S⊆X
−i
(
n− 1
j
)−1
ρi(S).
The inner sum can be considered as an expectation over
a uniform probability mass function, hence we can write
φi =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
E[ρi(S)]. (6)
This form of the Shapley Value suggests an estima-
tion approach based on stratified sampling [18]. For
participant i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let stratum j be the set
of marginal contributions of that participant to every
subset S ⊆ X−i of size |S| = j. We randomly and
independently draw N ij samples ρi1,j , . . . , ρiNij ,j from
each stratum j. Define the sample mean for participant
i as the random variable
T (ρik,j) =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
1
N ij
Nij∑
k=0
ρik,j
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
ρij , (7)
where the random variable ρij is the sample mean of
the data drawn from stratum j. This sample mean is a
linear unbiased estimate of φi and would be a reasonable
estimate of φi except for the fact that the sum of the
estimates may not be equal to the total budget v(X ),
which would violate the efficiency axiom of the Shapley
Value. We therefore use the sample averages as basis for
computing the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of
the Shapley Values with the budget constraint as follows.
Assume that the number of samples from each stratum
is sufficiently large so that we can use the central limit
theorem to approximate the distribution of ρij by a
Gaussian with mean µj,i = E[ρi(S)] and variance σ2j,i.
By independence of the sample averages, it follows that
the variance of T (ρik,j),
σ2i =
1
n2
n−1∑
j=0
σ2j,i,
and T (ρik,j) ∼ N (φi, σ2i ).
By independence of the sample averages
f(T (ρik,j)|φi), i ∈ X , the likelihood function can
be written as
f(T (ρ1k,j), . . . , T (ρ
n
k,j)|φ1 . . . φn) =
n∏
i=1
f
(
T (ρik,j)|φi
)
.
(8)
Since the sample averages T (ρik,j) are Gaussian, we
consider the log likelihood function
n∑
i=1
log
(
f
(
T (ρik,j)|φi
))
= ζ −
n∑
i=1
(
T (ρik,j)− φi
)2
2σ2i
,
(9)
where ζ is not a function of φi. To obtain the ML
estimates of the Shapley Values we then need to solve
the optimization problem with respect to φi:
maximize
φi
ζ −
n∑
i=1
(
T (ρik,j)− φi
)2
2σ2i
subject to
n∑
i=1
φi = v(X ). (10)
To solve this problem, we form the Lagrangian
L = ζ −
n∑
i=1
(
T (ρik,j)− φi
)2
2σ2i
+ λ
(
v(X ) −
n∑
i=1
φi
)
.
This is a convex optimization problem and has a simple
analytical solution.
Theorem 3.1: The ML estimates of φi are given by
φˆi = T (ρ
i
k,j)−
σ2i∑n
m=0 σ
2
m
(
vˆ(X ) − v(X )
)
, (11)
where vˆ(X ) =
∑n
i=1 T (ρ
i
k,j).
Note that all properties of the Shapley Value (effi-
ciency, symmetry, null player, linearity [19]) hold in
expectation in equation (11), with the added benefit that
the budget is always balanced, as the constraint in the
optimization problem (10) is satisfied.
A. Sample allocation
We now turn our attention to the question of how many
samples we should select from each stratum. Suppose
we have a total budget of N samples per participant,
i.e.,
∑n−1
j=0 N
i
j = N for every i ∈ X . How do we
divide them among the strata? One reasonable approach
4would be to allocate the samples for each participant i
to minimize the variance of the sample mean T (ρik,j)
subject to ∑n−1j=0 N ij = N . The following shows that the
optimal sample allocation is the Neyman allocation [18]
for equal weighting.
Lemma 3.2: The minimum variance of T (ρik,j) sub-
ject to ∑n−1j=0 N ij = N is
σ2i,SD =
1
N
mean(σj,i)
2, (12)
where σj,i is the standard deviation of the population
in stratum j for participant i. The value of mean(σj,i)
is calculated by averaging over the n values of σj,i for
participant i.
The values of N ij that achieve this minimum are
N ij =
σj,i∑n−1
m=0 σm,i
, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
The proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix A.
It is interesting to compare the achievable variance
of the sample means using the above optimal stratified
sampling to the more commonly used uniform sampling.
With uniform sampling, we draw N samples indepen-
dently at random from the set of marginal contributions
of participant i without taking strata into consideration.
The variance of the sample average for this approach is
σ2i,RS =
1
N
[
mean(σ2j,i) + var(µj,i)
]
, (13)
where µj,i is the mean value of the population in stratum
j for participant i. The value var(µj,i) is calculated as
the variance of the n values of µj,i for participant i. The
proof of this fact is given in Appendix B.
Sampling according to the Neyman Allocation
(lemma 3.2) requires prior knowledge of the standard
deviation of each stratum for each participant, which
is not realistic. A more practical approach would be
to sample equally from each of the n stratum, i.e.,
N ij = N/n. With this allocation, the variance of the
sample average is
σ2i,ES =
1
N
mean(σ2j,i). (14)
The proof of this fact follows readily from the proof
of (13) and is omitted. Comparing the variances for these
three allocation strategies, we can clearly see that
σ2i,SD ≤ σ
2
i,ES ≤ σ
2
i,RS. (15)
Hence, it is always better to sample in proportion to
standard deviations. In the following section we describe
a reinforcement learning algorithm for estimating these
standard deviations during sampling.
B. Approximating Optimum Stratified Sampling
Implementing an approximation to SD sampling is
a typical reinforcement learning problem in which the
algorithm seeks to exploit the information it has about
the standard deviations of the strata to sample correctly,
but must at the same time explore in order to accurately
calculate these very standard deviations. In our setting,
the goal is to sample a specific (but unknown) number
of times from each stratum. This differs from the usual
reinforcement learning problems where the goal is to
converge on a single optimum action that maximizes
the total reward. This contrast means that some tech-
niques (such as ǫ-greedy, Pursuit and Reinforcement
Comparison) are not suitable, and other approaches must
be altered to make them suitable for the problem at
hand; see [20] for information on reinforcement learning.
By comparison, stochastic methods [20] which assign
a probability to each action in accordance with the
expected reward (or standard deviation in this case) are
quite suitable to our setting.
Our proposed algorithm 1 explicitly “explores” the
problem space initially before gradually moving to an
“exploit” phase in which it uses the results of the
exploration to improve the sampling allocations. For
participant i, the probability of sampling from stratum j
at sample t ≤ N is
πj,i(t) = ǫ(t)
1
n
+ (1− ǫ(t))
σˆj,i∑n−1
m=0 σˆm,i
, (16)
where σˆj,i is the current estimate of the standard devia-
tion of stratum j. The choice of ǫ(t) is left to the user,
but should be a decreasing function of t with ǫ(0) = 1.
We implemented a number of such functions (including
the stepped function described in [21]) and found the
most accurate to be the double sigmoid function
ǫ(t) = κ−
1
1 + e−
t−γN
βN
, (17)
where κ is chosen to ensure ǫ(0) = 1. Increasing γ in the
above equation reduces the percentage of samples used
for exploration, and increasing β increases the transition
time from exploration to exploitation.
At each step t, Algorithm 1 chooses stratum j with
probability πj,i(t) for participant i. The probabilities
are then updated for the next iteration. The vector of
standard deviations is updated in each step using a
numerically stable algorithm from [22]. The algorithm
returns the sample mean T (ρik,j) for participant i as
well as the variance of that statistic, σ2i . Once this has
been calculated for all n participants, the MLE can be
computed using equation (11) to ensure that the budget
is balanced.
If σ2i,SD << σ2i,ES, then implementing Algorithm 1
will significantly reduce the variance of the sample
5Algorithm 1 Approximating SD sampling
procedure STANDARDDEVIATIONSAMPLING(N , i)
t← 1
µˆj,i ← 0 ⊲ Estimate of µ ∈ Rn
σˆj,i ← 0 ⊲ Estimate of σ ∈ Rn
c← 0 ⊲ Vector where cj is the number of samples taken from stratum j, c ∈ Rn
m2← 0 ⊲ Vector of the sum of squared differences from the current mean of stratum j, m2 ∈ Rn
while t ≤ N do
πj,i(t)← ǫ(t)
1
n
+ (1− ǫ(t)) σˆj∑n−1
m=0 σm,i
Choose stratum j at random, weighted by πj,i(t).
Choose a random coalition, S ⊆ X−i where |S| = j.
x← ρi(S) ⊲ x is a sample from stratum j
cj ← cj + 1 ⊲ Update the count for stratum j
∆← x− µˆj,i
µˆj,i ← µˆj,i +
∆
cj
⊲ Online update for estimate of µj,i
m2j ← m2j +∆(x − µˆj,i)
σˆj,i ←
√
m2j
cj−1
⊲ Online update for estimate of σj,i
end while
T (ρij,k)← mean(µˆj,i)
σ2i =
1
n2
∑n−1
j=0 σˆ
2
j,i
return T (ρij,k), σ2i
end procedure
mean. If however, σ2i,SD ≈ σ2i,ES, then the benefit of the
algorithm may well be outweighed by the complexity
involved in the implementation and time involved in its
execution. Comparing σ2i,SD to σ2i,ES, we have
σ2i,SD
σ2i,ES
= 1 +
var(σ2j,i)
mean(σj,i)2
. (18)
Hence, if var(σ2j,i)/mean(σj,i)2 ≈ 0, sampling equally
from each strata would be preferable.
IV. DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS
We demonstrate the use of the Shapley Value to
distribute compensation among the participants in two
illustrative DR programs. In practice, more complex
value functions could be used achieving the similar gains
in performance.
A. DR providing Reserve
In this DR example, each participant in the program
agrees when requested to reduce its load by a predefined
amount Xi ∈ R+ (loads can be reduced for example by
dimming lights or controlling HVAC in a building). The
operator then offers a quantity M of “spinning reserve”
to a utility where
∑n
i=1Xi ≥M,M ∈ R+. This ensures
that the program has a leeway of ∆M =
∑n
i=1Xi−M .
When a demand response event is requested, each partic-
ipant responds appropriately. There may be a discrepancy
between a participant’s actual reduction in consumption,
X˜i, and the promised reduction amount Xi, which we
denote ∆Xi = Xi − X˜i. The value ∆Xi can be
thought of as participant i’s contribution to the penalty
which will be imposed if the total discrepancy across
all n participants exceeds ∆M . We then take the value
function for this DR program to be
v(S) = −q
[∑
i∈S
∆Xi −∆M
]
+
, (19)
where S ⊆ X and [x]+ = max{x, 0} (i.e., the value
function is non-zero only when the DR program is
unable to meet the agreed upon reduction of M ) and
q > 0 is a constant that converts energy to a penalty
levied by the utility on the DR operator, which without
loss of generality can be set to 1. Note that the value
function in (19) is a form of a budget-additive function. It
is submodular and as such is compatible with the Shapley
Value.
A value function such as that in (19) models well
the Aggregator Managed Portfolio (AMP) Demand Re-
sponse programs offered through PG&E and operated
by various third parties. Non-compliance penalties are
imposed on the aggregators: “The aggregators are pe-
nalized if they fail to deliver their committed load
reductions. The penalties vary based on the shortfall,
with larger penalties for larger shortfalls. Aggregators
determine compensation and/or penalties for their par-
ticipating customers.” Using the Shapley Value as a
6means of determining compensation is of great relevance
to such aggregators.
To compare the performance of the sampling tech-
niques we discussed in Section III, we consider a small
set of n = 20 participants so that we can compute the
exact Shapley Value (ground truth).
Figure 1 plots the sample mean and standard deviation
for each stratum when using the value function (19) for a
representative participant i. As can be seen, our stratified
sampling algorithm which approximates sampling in
proportion to the standard deviations shows significant
improvements over both uniform and random sampling
because strata 0 to 10 have zero mean (and standard
deviation) and as such do not contribute to the Shapley
Value and the samples taken from these strata in the
uniform and random sampling methods are wasted.
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Fig. 1. Mean (top) and standard deviation (bottom) for each stratum.
A red “x” indicates the final estimate from employing Algorithm 1
with N = 5000 samples.
Remark. As mentioned in Section III-B, we imple-
mented the reinforcement learning algorithm using vari-
ous ǫ(t) functions. Figure 2 plots the sample size against
“regret,” defined as the difference between the variance
of the Shapley Value estimate for a given ǫ(t) and that
of the estimate calculated using exact SD sampling. As
can be seen, the sigmoid function (with γ = 0.2 and
β = 0.075) which we use in all numerical results closely
approximates ideal sampling.
Figure 3 shows the reduction in variance of the Shap-
ley Value estimate as we change our sampling technique,
indicating that estimating the standard deviations in this
scenario could significantly reduce error in the Shap-
ley Value. Implementing the proposed reinforcement
learning algorithm reduces the empirical variance to
a level approaching that achievable when the standard
deviations are known in advance.
In Figure 4 we compare the estimated and actual
Shapley Values for seven of the twenty participants for
0.7 ≤ ∆Xi ≤ 0.8. The estimates of the Shapley Values
were calculated using N = 5000 samples. For this
single instance, it can be seen that employing stratified
2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000
0
5
10
15 x 10
−6
Samples, N
R
eg
re
t
 
 
σ proportional sampling (ideal)
Equal sampling from strata
Random sampling
Sigmoid ε(t)
Fig. 2. Decrease in ‘regret’ as sample size increases for various ǫ(t)
functions. The upper dashed line is the regret from uniform sampling
and the lower dashed line at zero regret corresponds to ideal sampling.
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10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
Samples, N
σ
2
 
 
Sigmoid ε(t)
Random Sampling
Equal Sampling from strata
σ proportional sampling (ideal)
Fig. 3. Change in variance as sample size increases.
sampling reduces the error significantly when compared
to random sampling.
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
0.12
0.125
0.13
0.135
∆ X
i
φ i(
v)
 
 
Actual
Random Sampling
Equal Sampling from strata
σ proportional sampling (ideal)
Sigmoid ε(t)
Fig. 4. Actual and estimates of the Shapley Values for seven of the
twenty participants in the DR program. The estimates are calculated
using N = 5000.
We determine the accuracy of the sampling methods
using the mean squared prediction error
MSPE = E
[(
φi − φˆi
)2]
. (20)
For ease of comparison, we normalize the MSPE for
each method by the MSPE for σ proportional sampling
(the ideal method). Table I contains the comparison
7TABLE I
THE NORMALIZED MSPE FOR THE VARIOUS SAMPLING METHODS.
Method Normalized MSPE
Random Sampling 26.3084
Equal Sampling from strata 4.6521
σ proportional sampling (ideal) 1
Sigmoid ǫ(t) 1.8050
results. It is clear that employing stratified sampling
gives much better results than simple random sampling.
The learning algorithm significantly outperforms uni-
form stratified sampling and approaches the accuracy of
ideal stratified sampling.
B. Deferrable Load following
The second DR program we consider is deferrable
load following, which is described in detail in [23]. In
this program, Xi ∈ RT+ is a load profile for participant
i ∈ X of T time steps. Given a set S ⊆ X , the operator
wishes to schedule (i.e., delay in time) a number of loads
of the participants in S such that the new aggregate load
profile s ∈ RT+ approximates a predefined target load
profile y ∈ RT+. This target profile is chosen in advance.
Each load has a maximum allowable delay which may
be 0 if the load is not schedulable. This problem reduces
to a “knapsack packing” exercise, hence it is NP hard.
To approximate a polynomial time solution, we use a
greedy algorithm [23] that analyses each load and its set
of possible delays in order to maximize at each step the
functional
v(S) =
1
T
(
||y||22 − ||y− s||22
)
, (21)
where S ⊆ X , and s is the aggregate load profile
produced by appropriately scheduling the loads of the
participants in S. The function v(S) is maximized when
s = y. The interested reader is referred to [23] for a
detailed discussion of this scheme. In Figure 5 we see
the unscheduled aggregate together with the target profile
y on the left and the scheduled aggregate s on the right.
The data used to generate these figures and results was
taken from the Plugwise dataset, which contains plug
level load data. The raw data is divided into 24 hour
blocks. Each block is labeled with a user ID, timestamp,
device description, and total energy consumption per
hour for that device.
We assume that the operator of the DR program has
realized revenue from operating the scheme and wishes
to distribute this revenue fairly among the participants
using the Shapley Value.
The nature of the load following algorithm means
that it is not very illuminating to analyze small load
sets. Hence in this case, we take a much larger load
set containing n = 500 load profiles. For the load
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Fig. 5. Unscheduled aggregate on the left and scheduled aggregate
on the right.
following scheme, each load profile has 24 data points
corresponding to hourly smart-meter readings. Again, a
typical load was isolated from the Plugwise dataset and
a detailed analysis was performed on that load.
Figure 6 plots the sample means and standard devia-
tions of the strata when using the value function (21).
Calculating equation (18) for this instance results in
σ2i,SD ≈ σ
2
i,ES, and so the benefits of algorithm 1 will
not be significant in this case.
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0
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µ j
,i
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.1
0.2
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σ
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Fig. 6. Estimated mean (top) and estimated standard deviation
(bottom) for each stratum. Each stratum was sampled 200 times to
estimate the mean and standard deviation.
Using the estimates of the stratum means and stan-
dard deviations in figure 6 to calculate the variance of
the Shapley Value estimated using the three sampling
techniques produces plots in figure 7. As the plots
for change in variance using both ideal sampling and
uniform weighted sampling are quite similar, the added
benefit of using algorithm 1 will indeed be outweighed
by the complexity involved in its implementation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the use of the Shapley Value
to distribute the penalty among the participants in a
DR program. As the Shapley Value is computationally
intractable in general, we proposed a stratified sam-
pling technique that reduces the number of samples
needed to achieve a desired estimation accuracy while
satisfying the budget balance constraint. We found that
optimal stratified sampling requires prior knowledge of
8100 1,000 10,000
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Samples, N
σ
2
 
 
Random Sampling
Equal Sampling from strata
σ proportional sampling (ideal)
Fig. 7. Change in variance as sample size increases for the deferrable
load scheduling program. Note how close the curves are for both ideal
sampling and uniform weighted sampling.
the standard deviations of the strata, which may not be
available. As such, we proposed a reinforcement learning
heuristic which estimates the standard deviations and
uses them to adjust the sample allocation among the
strata. We demonstrated the use of the Shapley Value
in DR programs numerically, describing one scenario
(DR providing reserve) where the reinforcement learning
algorithm can significantly reduce the variance of the
estimate and another scenario (deferrable load following)
where sampling equally from each stratum is very nearly
as effective as implementing the algorithm.
It should be noted also that this method is agnostic to
the specifics of the characteristic function under analysis,
and can therefore be used to estimate the Shapley Value
for any cooperative games, not only the DR programs
analyzed in this paper. Also, this method ensures that the
“budget balancing” constraint is met. To our knowledge,
this constraint has not previously been considered in
other research on estimating the Shapley Value using
random sampling techniques. However, its importance
is clear in DR programs such as those described here,
where a given penalty needs to be distributed in its
entirety among participants.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
The variance of the sample mean of stratum j is
var(µˆj,i) =
σ2j,i
Nj,i
.
The optimization problem is therefore:
minimize var(T (ρik,j))
subject to
n−1∑
j=0
Nj,i = N.
Forming the Lagrangian
L =
1
n2
n−1∑
j=0
σ2j,i
Nj,i
+ λ

n−1∑
j=0
Nj,i −N

 .
Differentiating and setting equal to 0 results in
Nj,i = N
σj,i∑n−1
m=0 σm,i
.
Substituting back yields
var(T (ρik,j)) =
1
N

 1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σj,i

 ·
(
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
σm,i
)
,
var(φˆi) =
1
N
(mean(σj,i))
2 .
B. Proof of Equation (13)
A formulation for the Shapley Value is (see equa-
tion (4))
φi =
1
n!
∑
R
ρi(P
R
i ),
where R is an ordering of all players and PRi is the
set of players which precede i in the order R. The
statistic T (ρik,j) is calculated by a random sampling of
orderings R, i.e., if N random orderings R are analyzed,
the statistic is
T (ρik,j) =
1
N
∑
R
ρi(P
R
i ).
Assuming the marginal contributions are uncorrelated,
the variance of the estimate is
var
(
T (ρik,j)
)
=
1
N2
∑
R
var
(
ρi(P
R
i )
)
.
We define the random variable J to be a discrete uniform
distribution with support {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1, and a sample
from this distribution is therefore a random strata index,
j. By the law of total variance and conditioning on J ,
we then have
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
))
= E
[
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
)]
+ var
(
E
[
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
])
.
We note that
σ2j,i = var
(
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
)
and µj,i = E
[
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
]
.
Therefore,
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
))
= mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i) .
Substituting back gives
var
(
T (ρik,j)
)
=
1
N2
∑
R
[
mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i)
]
=
1
N
[
mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i)
]
.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
The variance of the sample mean of stratum j is
var(µˆj,i) =
σ2j,i
Nj,i
.
The optimization problem is therefore:
minimize var(T (ρik,j))
subject to
n−1∑
j=0
Nj,i = N.
Forming the Lagrangian
L =
1
n2
n−1∑
j=0
σ2j,i
Nj,i
+ λ

n−1∑
j=0
Nj,i −N

 .
Differentiating and setting equal to 0 results in
Nj,i = N
σj,i∑n−1
m=0 σm,i
.
Substituting back yields
var(T (ρik,j)) =
1
N

 1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σj,i

 ·
(
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
σm,i
)
,
var(φˆi) =
1
N
(mean(σj,i))
2
.
B. Proof of Equation (12)
A formulation for the Shapley Value is (see equation
(3))
φi =
1
n!
∑
R
ρi(P
R
i ),
where R is an ordering of all players and PRi is the
set of players which precede i in the order R. The
statistic T (ρik,j) is calculated by a random sampling of
orderings R, i.e., if N random orderings R are analyzed,
the statistic is
T (ρik,j) =
1
N
∑
R
ρi(P
R
i ).
Assuming the marginal contributions are uncorrelated,
the variance of the estimate is
var
(
T (ρik,j)
)
=
1
N2
∑
R
var
(
ρi(P
R
i )
)
.
We define the random variable J to be a discrete uniform
distribution with support {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1, and a sample
from this distribution is therefore a random strata index,
j. By the law of total variance and conditioning on J ,
we then have
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
))
= E
[
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
)]
+ var
(
E
[
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
])
.
We note that
σ2j,i = var
(
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
)
and µj,i = E
[
ρi
(
PRi
)
|J
]
.
Therefore,
var
(
ρi
(
PRi
))
= mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i) .
Substituting back gives
var
(
T (ρik,j)
)
=
1
N2
∑
R
[
mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i)
]
=
1
N
[
mean(σ2j,i) + var (µj,i)
]
.
C. Proof of Equation (13)
For participant i, the variance of the sample mean of
stratum j is
var(µˆj,i) =
σ2j,i
N/n
.
As T (ρik,j) is the mean of µˆj,i and assuming the strata
are uncorrelated, we have
var(T (ρik,j)) =
1
n2
n−1∑
j=0
var(µˆj,i) =
1
N
mean(σ2j,i).
